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Abstract Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a novel form
of funding that has driven billions of dollars into the
blockchain ecosystem, potentially challenging tradition-
al funding vehicles such as business angel or venture
capital investments. However, little is known of entre-
preneurs’ rationales for leveraging this emerging form
of financing. This article investigates the economic and
behavioral factors that motivate entrepreneurs to fund
their startup operations with ICOs. By conducting in-
depth interviews with C-level managers or founders of
ICO-funded startups, our analysis reveals four dimen-
sions that have an impact on the decision: (1) funding,
(2) community building, (3) tokenomics, and (4) per-
sonal and ideological drivers. Our findings suggest that
the entrepreneur’s social identity in conjunction with the
enabling mechanisms of the blockchain technology
shape entrepreneurial pursuits and funding choice. We
contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial finance by
increasing understanding of ICOs and to the literature
on entrepreneurial decision making by providing quali-
tative insights into the influence of founder identity on
key decisions in startups such as financing.
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1 Introduction
The growth of small firms is often constrained by inter-
nal financing (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Especially
for capital-intensive, high-technology startups, financ-
ing is vital to compete and survive in the marketplace
(Colombo and Grilli 2007). One of the most fundamen-
tal, yet often most difficult, steps for entrepreneurs is to
find and choose from among different sources of capital
to fund their startup, as this decision can have an impact
on future startup growth and success (Cassar 2004;
Schwienbacher 2013).
Leveraging the blockchain technology, startups have
only recently started to fund their operations with initial
coin offerings (ICOs), oftentimes also referred to as
token sales (Fisch 2019). In ICOs, entrepreneurs distrib-
ute digital assets—such as coins and tokens—to inves-
tors (hereafter also called token holders) in exchange for
capital. These tokens take on different functions and
utilities within the issuer’s network as soon as the pro-
ject is launched. In many regards, ICOs differ from
prominent funding vehicles such as business angels
(BA) and venture capital (VC). The funding amounts
in ICOs exceed most investment rounds by traditional
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seed rounds (Boreiko and Sahdev 2018). ICOs are also
distinct from traditional crowdfunding insofar as the
blockchain technology transfers some of its implications
and characteristics, e.g. transparency, immutability, de-
centralization, and openness, to properties of the ICO
(Kher et al. 2020). These technological features may not
only pose certain restrictions on who can leverage this
technology to their favor (Nambisan 2017) but also
attract a different set of investors (Fisch et al. 2019). In
this regard, ICOs represent a social and technological
innovation. It is well-noted that the analysis of such new
phenomena can serve as a valuable setting and oppor-
tunity to apply and extend existing theories (Makadok
et al. 2018).
The literature on entrepreneurial finance in regard to
ICOs is developing quickly (Adhami et al. 2018; Fisch
2019; Huang et al. 2019; Masiak et al. 2019).With more
startups utilizing this funding vehicle, the research rele-
vance of the topic for the field of not only entrepreneur-
ial finance but also entrepreneurial decision making is
becoming increasingly apt. How entrepreneurs choose
from among funding alternatives has been investigated
in the academic literature with a focus on capital struc-
tures, the choice between equity and debt financing, and
the intersection between financing demand and supply
(Scherr et al. 1993; Chaganti et al. 1995; Winton and
Yerramilli 2008; Robb and Robinson 2014). Popular
theoretical frameworks such as pecking order theory
(Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984), however, are
limited for explaining funding choice. As Myers (1984)
notes himself: “the pecking order hypothesis can be
quickly rejected if we require it to explain everything”
and, more importantly, it only serves as “a description of
typical behavior” (p. 582). We know that, after all,
entrepreneurs oftentimes exhibit atypical decision mak-
ing behavior due to uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk
involved in entrepreneurial ventures (Busenitz and
Barney 1997; Sarasvathy 2001; Baron 2008). Pecking
order theory, in contrast, primarily makes predictions
based on information asymmetry and the cost of capital,
thereby ignoring different supply sources of funding as
well as demand-side considerations and motives for
choosing specific sources. As Cassar (2004) points
out, the dominance of the founders as the primary deci-
sion makers in a startup raises questions about their
personal role and influence over funding choice which
is not considered in capital structure theories. Decision
criteria and characteristics of the demand side, especial-
ly concerning the role of the founders and/or CEO, are
underexplored in the entrepreneurial finance literature
and become more relevant in the light of novel and
innovative funding sources such as crowdfunding or
ICOs. Building on this idea, some authors have already
hinted at the entrepreneur’s perception of the startup,
entrepreneurial orientation, and personal control prefer-
ences as further non-financial determinants beyond the
cost of capital (Chandler and Hanks 1998; Eckhardt
et al. 2006; Vaznyte and Andries 2019).
These theoretical as well as conceptual tensions, in
conjunction with the growing anecdotal evidence and
importance of ICOs for entrepreneurial finance, moti-
vated our research endeavor in understanding entrepre-
neurial funding choice. To date, the literature on ICOs
has provided valuable insights into this novel phenom-
enon (Adhami et al. 2018; Fisch 2019; Huang et al.
2019; Masiak et al. 2019). Yet, the underlying motiva-
tions and reasons for ICOs, which constitute the re-
search interest of this qualitative study, are still unclear.
Therefore, in this paper we address the following ques-
tion: what are the economic and behavioral drivers that
motivate an entrepreneur’s choice of funding via an
ICO?
In addressing this question, we follow recent calls
from scholars to investigate the impact of digital tech-
nology on entrepreneurial processes (Nambisan 2017),
new funding opportunities for entrepreneurs (Drover
et al. 2017), as well as how entrepreneurs assess and
choose among these sources (Shepherd et al. 2015). We
draw from research in the entrepreneurial finance (Block
et al. 2018a; Cumming and Groh 2018) and entrepre-
neurial decision making literature (Shepherd et al. 2015;
Koudstaal et al. 2018; Markowska et al. 2018) while
framing our discussion with social identity theory
(Ashforth and Mael 1989) to evaluate why startups
decide to pursue an ICO.
To answer our research question, we conducted 37
semi-structured interviews with C-level managers (i.e.,
senior management such as CEO, CTO, COO) or foun-
ders of ICO-funded startups and experts. Utilizing a
multiple case-study strategy (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin
2003) and adopting a qualitative perspective, we induc-
tively uncover the different motives, as well as the
economic and behavioral drivers of entrepreneurs and
startups in choosing ICOs as a means of capital funding.
Following a structured and rigorous methodology for
analyzing our data as established by Gioia et al. (2013),
we derive four main dimensions, which serve as the
constitutive elements of our model of why startups
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decide to perform an ICO: (1) funding, (2) community
building, (3) tokenomics, and (4) personal and ideolog-
ical drivers. These dimensions can be understood as
financially as well as personally driven and thus reflect
the behavioral and economic factors that motivate
startups and founders to opt for an ICO. Our findings
suggest that entrepreneurs’ rationales for pursuing an
ICO cover a multifaceted spectrum, which diverges
from the single purpose of funding the startup. By not
fitting the traditional characteristics and performance
criteria of venture capitalists, the blockchain ecosystem
and respective entrepreneurs developed their own social
identity, which is reflected in different approaches to
entrepreneurial judgment, choice and management and
consequently affects funding choice.
Beyond filling a void in the literature in entrepreneur-
ial finance to help demask ICOs as a new phenomenon
and source of capital, this exploratory research makes
additional contributions to the entrepreneurship litera-
ture and to our framing theory. First, we extend research
on entrepreneurial decision making (Shepherd et al.
2015), showing that entrepreneurs’ rationales for pursu-
ing an ICO go beyond financing the startup. While
economic drivers or the perception of the startup and
surrounding market has been the focus of the respective
literature stream, we demonstrate that behavioral and
ideological motives play distinct roles in funding choice
that have not been captured by relevant capital structure
theories and draw parallels to the emerging literature on
entrepreneurial identity. Second, and related to this, we
contribute to social identity theory in entrepreneurship
and to the identity perspective on entrepreneurial behav-
ior (Fauchart and Gruber 2011; Gruber and MacMillan
2017) by offering further insights into the influence of
founder identity on key decisions in startups such as
financing. Our evidence indicates a strong ideological
divide between the blockchain community and conven-
tional entrepreneurship, which segregates these entre-
preneurs from traditional funding vehicles. Entrepre-
neurs in the blockchain ecosystem show considerable
tendencies to follow the narrative surrounding the in-
vention of Bitcoin, which was built on the premise of
superseding the current financial system and a more
transparent society. Personal beliefs and values of the
entrepreneur, and hence decision making, are thus in-
fluenced by this cult-like account, in conjunction with
legitimacy concerns. Lastly, we can expand on the
growing stream on digital entrepreneurship (Nambisan
2017). As a new form of digital technology, the
blockchain shows a considerable impact on shaping
entrepreneurial pursuits and processes. It reconfigures
the locus of entrepreneurial agency as it enables non-
conventional founders to get access to financial and
non-financial resources and further develop their ideas,
thereby deviating from more traditional pathways to
entrepreneurship. The technology further redefines the
boundaries of agency as it is able to incorporate a
diverse range of stakeholders, incentivize them, and
democratize decision making in a startup, therefore
leading to community-building and a more collective
way of engaging in entrepreneurship. These technolog-
ical shifts go hand in hand with the abovementioned
social identity of the founders and entrepreneurs: com-
munity building, shared value creation, and a joint mis-
sion and belief system shape the economic and
sociotechnical interactions between founders, commu-
nity, and technology. The ICO becomes a manifestation
of the underlying technology, but also of the social
ecosystem.
2 Background
2.1 Entrepreneurial finance and funding choice
Research on entrepreneurial finance has highlighted
several sources of financing for startups and entrepre-
neurs, namely banks, family and friends, business an-
gels, and venture capital (Drover et al. 2017). Over the
years, new ways to raise capital have emerged (e.g.,
crowdfunding) and new investment opportunities have
been introduced (Block et al. 2018a). Based on these
developments, Drover et al. (2017) propose studying
new sources of capital, especially how these “comple-
ment or challenge existing theories and assumptions” (p.
1843). As the range of funding opportunities widens for
the entrepreneur, it becomes imperative to understand
the interdependencies and implications of each funding
vehicle for the startup and how entrepreneurs choose
among them.
Logic from pecking order theory suggests that a
firm’s funding decision is largely based on decreasing
the cost of capital associated with respective financing
sources (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). Firms
will thus prefer to fund their operations with internal
funds before selecting debt or equity financing, as asym-
metrical information costs create obstacles to external
funding. While Winton and Yerramilli (2008) find that
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startups and small businesses might opt for equity over
debt financing, especially for high-risk and uncertain
strategies that have only a low probability of success,
extant research has shown that the pecking order theory
also holds for small firms (Degryse et al. 2012) and for
new and high-tech ventures (Vanacker and Manigart
2010; Robb and Robinson 2014). Pecking order theory
might, however, not fully explain funding choice.Myers
(1984) notes that the pecking order hypothesis is insuf-
ficient to explain funding choices of the whole popula-
tion of firms, but only accounts for “typical behavior”
(p. 582). It is questionable whether startups fall under
this definition as entrepreneurs frequently display dif-
ferent decision making behavior accounting for the dis-
tinct nature of their uncertain and risky venture
(Busenitz and Barney 1997; Sarasvathy 2001; Baron
2008). This point is also stressed by Cassar (2004)
who argues that the role of the entrepreneur is of partic-
ular importance in financing decisions and following
young firms in detail “may increase understanding of
the motivations for searching for different types of fi-
nance and the nature of such searches” (p. 279). In this
regard, scholars found evidence for the existence of
several types of entrepreneurs and different entrepre-
neurial identities that stress social and educational as-
pects (Fauchart and Gruber 2011).
We expect that the entrepreneurs’ personal and
behavioral motives have a distinct influence on deci-
sion making. Several entrepreneurs’ characteristics
have been theorized or found to play a role in funding
choice such as the entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards
maintaining managerial control within their startup
(Alvarez and Parker 2009), their perception of the
market (Eckhardt et al. 2006), or the entrepreneurs’
perceived risk attitude which is a function of an
entrepreneur’s personal characteristics and experi-
ence (Schwienbacher 2007). The latter can also be
related to Seghers et al. (2012), who show that man-
agement and industry experience, financial networks,
and prior business education determine funding de-
cisions (see also Gartner et al. 2012). Extant research
in this field is predominantly focused on business-
related drivers (Scherr et al. 1993; Chaganti et al.
1995; Schwienbacher 2007; Robb and Robinson
2014). Beyond capital structure theories, scholars
have drawn on learning models and theories (Cyert
and DeGroot 1987; Cohen and Levinthal 1990), mul-
tistage selection processes (Aldrich 1999), or the real
options approach (McGrath 1999).
New forms of funding are inciting researchers to
study and “explore the drivers behind why entrepre-
neurs select different forms of […] funding” (Wright
et al. 2016, p.231), as well as how different forms of
funding complement or substitute each other (Cumming
and Groh 2018), as they may attract a different set of
entrepreneurs “who are younger, more computer liter-
ate, and more connected” (Shepherd et al. 2015, p. 26)
and have a different set of personal drivers. In this
regard, ICOs are an emerging topic in the entrepreneur-
ial finance landscape, especially in conjunction with a
rising interest in blockchain technology and digital tech-
nologies in general (Nambisan 2017).
2.2 Blockchain and distributed ledger technology
With the introduction of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto
(2008) proposed a radically new distributed protocol
(known as blockchain and distributed ledger technolo-
gy)1, enabling consensus in permission-less settings
(i.e., digital environments in which anyone can join a
network without disclosing his or her identity). By using
cryptographic hash functions, computational puzzles
and economic incentives, Nakamoto designed a distrib-
uted public ledger that creates trust among participants
without the need for intermediaries or central authori-
ties. Transactions are recorded in blocks and broadcast
to all participants in the network (called “nodes”) for
verification of validity. As soon as consensus about the
state of the ledger is reached by a majority of partici-
pants in the network, the transactions are permanently
recorded in a transparent and verifiable manner, exclud-
ing subsequent modification or deletion.
The blockchain technology has been called “disrup-
tive” (Mattila 2016, p. 4), a “digital revolution” (Wright
and De Filippi 2015 p.2), a “new engine of growth”
(Crosby et al. 2016, p.9), and a “magic global computer”
(Buterin 2015). While the economic value of Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies, which Fisch et al. (2019)
defined as a “digital medi[a] of value exchange based on
the distributed ledger technology” (p. 2), is debatable,
blockchain technology has proven to be secure and
useful. Many public companies and syndicates such as
the Hyperledger project are opening up to blockchain
1 We are aware of the differences between blockchain and distributed
ledger technology. For simplification, we use both terms
interchangeably.
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and are investigating use cases and applications for their
own operations and processes (Cachin 2016).
Beyond currencies, smart contracts are an important
property of blockchains. With platforms such as
Ethereum, literally anybody can create their own token
or cryptocurrency and set up smart contracts, which are
programs that automatically execute the contract once
its object of agreement occurs (Buterin 2014). ICOs are,
in this regard, an upcoming development also driving
the popularity of cryptocurrencies, especially Ethereum
(Pietrewicz 2018).
2.3 Initial coin offerings
The increasing prevalence of ICOs has given rise to
nascent research on this rather unexplored topic. To
date, research examining ICOs has provided novel in-
sights by focusing on success factors (Adhami et al.
2018; Amsden and Schweizer 2018; Fisch 2019), the
geographical dispersion (Huang et al. 2019), or market
cycles and investor sentiment related to ICOs (Drobetz
et al. 2019; Masiak et al. 2019). Despite ICO’s promis-
ing relevance for entrepreneurial finance and entrepre-
neurship, the peer-reviewed literature is still scarce. We
plan to contribute to this growing line of inquiry by
increasing our understanding of the motives of entrepre-
neurs to opt for ICOs as a funding vehicle.
ICOs have been defined as an open call for funding
(Adhami et al. 2018) and an unregulated token sale to a
crowd of investors in exchange for capital funding
(Fisch 2019). Tokens issued in an ICO can represent
different characteristics and rights to the holder, such as
asset rights (representing ownership of or a claim on a
physical good on the blockchain), usage rights
(representing access to a service, similar to a coupon
or pre-sales-based crowdfunding), or work rights
(representing the contribution of work to a decentralized
network). Consider the examples of Swiss-based
blockchain startup Orocrypt, which released a token
representing the ownership of 30 g of bullion gold (asset
right); Irish-based startup Cloud With Me, which of-
fered a token representing access to distributed cloud
services (usage right); and US-based startup Protocol
Labs, which issued a token that a service provider stakes
to earn the right to perform work for the network (work
right). In all of these cases, the token does not represent
direct control over the company. Due to regulatory
concerns, the vast majority of ICO-funded startups re-
frains from issuing equity and securities via token sales.
Recently, however, startups have begun to move in this
direction by funding themselves via so-called security
token offerings (STOs), which can be regarded as an
advancement in the evolution of ICOs.
ICOs are credited with having the “potential to de-
mocratize innovation” and “reshape […] entrepreneur-
ship” (Chen 2018, p. 567), as they provide investors
around the globe the significant upside potential of
early-round investments and enable startups to share
wealth among developers, early adopters, and investors
(Chen 2018). For startups, ICOs are cheaper, faster, and
less troublesome compared to traditional funding alter-
natives and have been described as one of the most
efficient means of financing entrepreneurial initiatives,
as they minimize transaction costs and disintermediate
banking. Catalini and Gans (2018) show that tokens can
also help to foster network effects and coordinate stake-
holders within the blockchain ecosystem. In contrast,
token holders are exposed to significant investment risks
with no ability to control the startup and no protection in
case of bankruptcy. Furthermore, investors often invest
in early-stage projects that offer barely more than a
future promise or idea. Also associated with the lack
of a product or prototype is a more general lack of
information and uncertainty stemming from information
asymmetry (Adhami et al. 2018, Pietrewicz 2018).
A typical ICO is usually announced with the disclosure
of a white paper that describes the token sale, the under-
lying IT protocol and blockchain, the project, and the
business model. It also describes the distribution and func-
tion of the token, its holder’s rights, and its value. The
number of tokens is usually limited, with a set funding
limit. Themost commonway to offer tokens is via auction,
with proceeds going towards funding a startup or project
(Conley 2017). An excellent overview of what constitutes
an ICO can be found in Howell et al. (2018) as well as in
Boreiko and Sahdev (2018). The latter authors further
elaborate the evolution of the ICO and highlight the fea-
tures of different development stages.
Several authors have conducted empirical research
on ICOs with a focus on determinants and success
factors of token offerings (Adhami et al. 2018;
Amsden and Schweizer 2018; Blaseg 2018; Boreiko
and Sahdev 2018; Fisch 2019; Howell et al. 2018;
Momtaz 2018).We summarize these findings in Table 1.
Due to the unregulated nature of ICOs, there is no
complete and well-established database on ICOs, mak-
ing data collection difficult and time-consuming. Hence,
the sample size and quality differ widely across these
Why do startups pursue initial coin offerings (ICOs)? The role of economic drivers and social identity on...
publications, resulting in different opinions on what
constitutes a successful ICO. However, certain common
characteristics and success factors are identified. Among
these, the disclosure of the source code and white paper,
the quality of the management team and ICO-related
factors such as vesting schedules, the proportion of
tokens sold to the public, and the utility of the token
were mentioned most often.
We regard ICOs as a novel and compelling research
arena for inquiries into entrepreneurial finance and de-
cision making. While the number of ICOs in previous
years grew at a slow pace, 2017 saw a significant
expansion with around 400 ICOs, making it a main-
stream phenomenon in the blockchain ecosystem. De-
spite the lack of clear regulation or oversight, hundreds
of startups have announced or conducted ICOs so far.
According to the ICO tracking website coinschedule.
com, more than USD 31 billion were raised via ICOs
(03/2020) since 2016. The sheer magnitude of funding
for early-stage blockchain startups does not compare to
any other funding alternative for similar endeavors.
Further, ICOs seem to draw heavily on the technological
features and properties of the blockchain technology,
which has the possibility to create transparency,




Hand-collected dataset with 253 ICOs from
2014 to August 2017
The authors find a high success rate for ICOs in general. Funded projects
are largely blockchain or fintech related. The majority of distributed
tokens serve as utulity tokens.
ICO success (ICO completed) is attributed to:






Hand-collected dataset from ICObench.com
and Cryptoslate.com with 1009 ICOs
Based on the literature on venture and crowdfunding selection, the authors
find that success (conceptualized as listing on exchange) is:
•Attributed to management team (large team size, network)
•Negatively correlated to venture uncertainty (no social media presence,
short white paper, more tokens distributed)
Blaseg (2018) Hand-collected dataset with 1104 ICOs from
January 2014 to December 2017
Drawing on information economics theories on signaling and unraveling,
the author finds that success (conceptualized as listing on exchange) is
attributed to:




Hand-collected dataset with 423 ICOs from
March 2016 to March 2018
Using signaling theory, the author finds that success (amount raised) is
attributed to:
•Communication activity






Hand-collected dataset with 453 ICOs
between 2013 and January 2018
Liquidity and trading volume are higher for tokens that:
•Offer voluntary disclosure (disclose source code, publish white paper,
publish use of proceeds)
•Engage with their community (followers on Social Media)
•Credibly commit to the project (insider vesting schedule)
•Signal quality (entrepreneurial background, prior VC investment,
pre-sale, new blockchain protocol, clear utility for token)
Momtaz (2018) Icobench.com dataset with 2131 ICOs from
August 2015 until April 2018
The author finds that the market liquidity hypothesis holds in ICOs by
studying first-day returns. Success (first-day returns) is positively
affected by:
•Quality of management team*
•ICO profile (based on expert rating from ICObench)
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immutability, decentralization, and openness in the
funding process, something which is rather uncommon
in the entrepreneurial finance landscape. The effect of
these properties on the funding process is unknown.
Given the limited explanatory power of existing cap-
ital structure theories on the choice of funding sources
(Myers 1984), and the considerable role of the entrepre-
neur in decision making (Cassar 2004), understanding
the economic and behavioral drivers behind the choice
of a new funding source can deepen our knowledge in
entrepreneurial finance by demasking the ICO as a




The focus of this study is to develop a richer under-
standing of ICOs as a new and rather unexplored
phenomenon. Considering the exploratory nature of
this research topic, the novelty of ICO in academic
research as well as the limited understanding of why
founders opt for ICO funding, we use a multiple
case-study strategy (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).
We subscribe to the notion that new phenomena
are best understood by qualitative and inductive
research. Thus, we pursue our investigation induc-
tively and adopt a qualitative perspective (Corbin
and Strauss 1998) to discover the different economic
and behavioral drivers of entrepreneurs and startups
in choosing ICOs as a means of capital funding.
The gold rush caused by soaring cryptocurrency
valuations has created a great deal of noise and contro-
versy in the entrepreneurial community where ICOs are
concerned. We recognize that the world around us,
especially the blockchain and cryptocurrency ecosys-
tem, is socially constructed and subject to complex
social patterns. This recognition leads to the belief that
an interpretivist view is best suited for capturing this
complex phenomenon, as it attempts to seize the expe-
rience, opinions, and interpretations of informants with-
out shaping their views with prior theoretical concepts.
Following Gioia et al. (2013), we assume that infor-
mants are “knowledgeable agents” who can describe
their underlying motivations and rationale for their de-
cision making.
3.2 Sampling process
We focus on ICO-funded startups using a hand-
collected data set by Boreiko and Sahdev (2018) cover-
ing ICOs from January 2013 to September 2017. The
data was collected from Smith&Crown, Tokenmarket,
Icobazaar, and Coinschedule. These are dedicated ICO
tracker websites that we consider to be the most credible
and complete sources and are also used by other re-
searchers in this field (Fisch 2019). The data was further
enriched with information from the official websites of
respective startups, their social media presence, forums,
and press releases.
The initial sample yielded 383 ICO-funded
startups, of which we deemed 50 to be scam at-
tempts. To obtain first-hand information on the eco-
nomic and behavioral drivers and motives for an
ICO, we deliberately targeted either C-level man-
agers or founders and excluded startups where we
could not access these informants. A further 143
companies were excluded from the sample as they
did not provide sufficient contact details. We used
purposeful sampling for the remaining companies to
identify a diverse set of cases and thereby tried to
increase variation among the subjects of interest in
terms of the year of the ICO, amount raised, and
prior VC funding. Due to the novelty of this topic,
we sought to obtain the broadest range of informa-
tion and perspectives as possible. We contacted
companies via email , LinkedIn, Slack, and
Telegram.
We conducted interviews with 30 ICO-funded
startups. Moreover, as the blockchain scene is well-
connected, we leveraged the snowball sampling strate-
gy. Interviewees were asked to name startups and foun-
ders who would be of interest for our research. From this
method, we gained access to seven additional experts
that we interviewed for this study. The total sample size
thus consists of 37 interviews.
As a control mechanism, we tested for selection bias
using a binominal logit model computed on a database
of 333 firms that constituted the population of interest
for our study. We designated the year of the ICO, the
publication of a white paper (as an indicator for trans-
parency), the total amount raised in Bitcoin and USD (as
an indicator for success), and prior VC funding (as an
indicator for investor outreach) as predictors. None of
these variables emerged as a significant predictor
(p > .05) of inclusion in our sample (coded “1” for
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inclusion). This indicates that firms included in our
sample are unlikely to differ systematically from firms
that were not included.
Descriptive statistics of our final sample are as
follows: respondents’ firms conducted their ICO in
2017 (20), 2016 (6), 2015 (2), 2014 (1), and 2013
(1). Our sample reflects the different waves of ICOs
that were conducted in this time frame (Boreiko and
Sahdev 2018). We interviewed four respondents
whose firm raised less than USD 50,000, seven
who raised up to USD 1 million, thirteen who raised
up to USD 10 million, and four who raised more
than USD 10 million up to about USD 26 million.
For two cases, the amounts raised were not
disclosed. The startups of 28 respondents published
a white paper, while seven startups disclosed prior
VC funding.
3.3 Data collection
Given the limited research in this domain, we did
not propose specific hypotheses or strict interview
guidelines. However, since ICOs can be closely
related to the emerging literature on crowdsourcing
and crowdfunding, as well as on entrepreneurial
finance in general, we used general themes and
findings in this field to develop our interview guide
(e.g., Belleflamme et al. 2010; Schwienbacher and
Larralde 2012; Gerber et al. 2012; Moritz and Block
2016).
For the data collection, semi-structured interviews
were utilized as they serve the “purpose of obtaining
descriptions of the life world of the interviewee in
order to interpret the meaning of the described phe-
nomena” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p.3). By ap-
plying semi-structured interviews, we were able to
reap the benefits of acquiring an emic understanding
of the phenomenon from the interviewees them-
selves, as semi-structured interviews focus on a sub-
ject’s experience and knowledge of a theme and
draw on their own perspective (Kvale and
Brinkmann 2009). The interview guide was initially
tested with three pilot interviews and consequently
adapted.
We conducted interviews between June 2018 and
September 2018. The interviews took an average of
39 min, ranging from 21 to 72 min. The interviews
conducted yielded more than 24 h of tape-recorded
interviews that were transcribed into 426 pages of
text. All interviews were coded. The first ten inter-
views were simultaneously conducted by two inter-
viewers to reduce the risk of interviewer bias. More-
over, we wanted to maximize replication logic and
thus established a common research orientation and
research protocol (Yin 2003). We conducted subse-
quent interviews with single interviewers.
3.4 Data analysis
Our structured data analysis follows the “Gioia Meth-
odology” (Gioia et al. 2013). Although this research
design dates back to early ethnographic studies by
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) and Gioia et al. (1994), it
only recently gained popularity in a wide range of
qualitative entrepreneurship studies (e.g., Miozzo and
DiVito 2018), particularly in the still nascent research on
crowdfunding (e.g., McKenny et al. 2017; Block et al.
2018b; Estrin et al. 2018).
We used the computer software program MAXQDA
to systemize and code the data collected. To ensure
intercoder reliability, each transcribed interview was
coded by the two researchers individually and the codes
were subsequently compared to settle on a final inter-
pretation. This measure of researcher triangulation was
utilized to “guard against the biases associated with a
single role and set of role relationships, the personal
characteristics of the researcher, and his or her preferred
interpretive point of view” (Lofland and Lofland 1971,
p.93).
Overall, we iterated between the developing model
and the data until we achieved a viable set of first-order
codes, second-order themes, and aggregate dimensions.
We stopped when we reached “theoretical saturation”
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). For the sake of clarity, we
present our analysis in three sequential steps:
First, we began to identify first-order codes by “open
coding” (Corbin and Strauss 1998; Locke 2001) the
individual interviews regarding the rationale and mo-
tives for blockchain startups to perform an ICO. Each
researcher independently coded the data, and we then
compared and refined our categorization schemes to
assess reliability. The interviews yielded a database of
394 codable statements. Following Corley and Gioia
(2004), each statement consisted of a sentence or para-
graph conveying a coherent point about why the indi-
vidual startup decided to perform an ICO (Weber 1990).
These statements were categorized into mutually exclu-
sive and collectively exhaustive first-order codes.
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Second, we built upon these first-order codes with
the goal of detecting conceptual patterns and similari-
ties. Moving from the initial open coding to axial coding
(Locke 2001), we identified linkages and themes within
the first-order codes to derive second-order themes
(Gioia et al. 2013). For example, we aggregated state-
ments regarding the difficulty of receiving funding from
traditional institutional investors as Lack of other
funding options, statements regarding the distribution
of wealth as Democratization of wealth, and participa-
tion in the development of the network and startup by
the community as Wisdom of the crowd.
Third, we formed aggregate dimensions by raising
the level of abstraction and linking the various second-
order themes (Gioia et al. 2013) that emerged from the
data (as illustrated in Fig. 1) to build the data structure.
We derived four main dimensions, which serve as the
constitutive elements of our model of why startups
decide to perform an ICO: (1) funding, (2) community
building, (3) tokenomics, and (4) personal and ideolog-
ical drivers. We report the quantity and distribution of
the codes in Table 2. We find that the first two dimen-
sions had a strong prevalence in almost all interviews;
the same is true for personal and ideological drivers in
more than two thirds of our interviews. Tokenomics was
found with the lowest frequency but was still mentioned
in almost every second interview.
During this process, we spent considerable time both
discussing and interpreting the data. We also discussed
our emerging data structure with colleagues not in-
volved in the study (Lincoln and Guba 1985) with the
aim of ensuring the reliability of the coding.
4 Findings
Based on the data analysis (Fig. 1), the findings can be
unpacked into four distinct dimensions: funding, com-
munity building, tokenomics, and personal and ideolog-
ical drivers. We demonstrate evidence that all four di-
mensions play a crucial role in the choice of an ICO as a
funding vehicle. We describe the themes within each
dimension in the following.
4.1 Funding
Funding is described as the primary motive to conduct
an ICO. The way funds are raised make an ICO more
attractive to founders as well as respective investors.
4.1.1 Unlocking capital of individual investors globally
Initial coin offerings are perceived as a superior form of
traditional crowdfunding. In contrast, however, ICOs
remove the necessity for an underlying intermediary
platform such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo. The ability
to unlock capital from a wide range of individual inves-
tors on a global scale creates more funding opportunities
in terms of project range and scale, without the limita-
tions and costs imposed by a crowdfunding platform. As
one founder said: “ICOs are a version of crowdfunding,
but on steroids.” Further, individual investors are per-
ceived to come without the strong agenda traditional
investors have and are more open to projects and ideas
that would not get funded under a traditional venture
capital regime, such as open source projects or projects
that are difficult to commercialize. This also includes
startups from countries that do not have access to insti-
tutional money or are not on the radar of venture capi-
talists due to a small market or a lack of financial
infrastructure (e.g., Eastern Europe). An ICO makes
the location of the startup irrelevant. In fact, many
startups in our sample could not be allocated to a par-
ticular geographical location or country as they were
often composed of many employees and entities
forming virtual teams across different regions.
4.1.2 Creating liquidity
Most of the sampled startups issued utility tokens, which
represent access to a product or service that the startup is
going to provide in the future. Due to the nature of the
blockchain, many products and services can become
more valuable as network effects come into play. While
investors may not have a claim on the startup’s assets,
they profit from a growing network and increased usage
of the service as the token appreciates in value. The
ability to tokenize products and services creates direct
liquidity for traditionally rather illiquid assets. Many
startups exploit this token characteristic by listing the
token on c ryp to cu r r ency exchanges . The
cryptocurrency tracking website coinmarketcap.com
currently (03/2020) keeps record of more than 2000
different coins and tokens that are tradable on one of
many cryptocurrency exchanges. This gives investors
the opportunity to enter and exit on the spot and attracts
capital. For certain startups, the possibility to set a
market price for their products was crucial in opting
for an ICO.
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Fig. 1 Data structure: concepts, themes, and dimensions







• Protocol for decision making
• Use tokens a as a voting mechanism
• For governance of the ecosystem
• Intention to fully decentralise
• Distributed autonomous system requires a 
token
• Main value derived from transparency
• Deliver transparency and openness with open 
source technology
• Establish absolute immutability 
• Value proposition requires trust
• Token is transparent, provable and traceable
• Setup a decentralized network economy
• Cryptocurrency required to run the blockchain
• Token needed for the blockchain to operate
• Network needs a coin
• Raise capital without giving away equity and 
control rights
• No need to answer questions to any investor
• VC dictates terms
• Maintain more control
• Start project out of curiosity
• Experiment with token sale
• Get familiar with technology
• Test the waters
• An alternative economic system
• Holistic grassroots, decentralized approach
• More grassroots opposed to corporates 
• Create value together in a social way
• A model that’s much more democratic
• Wealth to be distributed more democratically
• Trailblaze financial freedom
• It’s open to every investor
• Offering access to closed asset class
• Stands for freedom of speech, privacy, 
human rights
• Interest in the progress of humanity 
• Try to change the world
• No need for a profit motive























Table 2 Count and distribution of codes and dimensions
Aggregate dimension No. of codes Prevalence among interviews
Funding 166 34 (92%)
Community building 98 31 (84%)
Tokenomics 45 18 (49%)
Personal and ideological drivers 85 26 (70%)
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4.1.3 Ease of funding
The ICO was generally described as an easy and effi-
cient funding process. Available ICO standards such as
the ERC-20 token, which is based on the Ethereum
blockchain, enabled even non-technical founders to is-
sue tokens and collect funds with minimal effort and
resources. One interviewee compared the simplicity of
issuing coins to starting a web shop, which has become
accessible to mom-and-pop stores in recent years. This
creates an influx of many ideas and projects into the ICO
market place, which usually do not have the opportunity
to get funded by traditional means. In general, an ICO
lowers barriers to entry for funding and is accessible to
everyone irrespective of ethical background, education,
or technical skills. This is also reflected in the variety of
our interviewees ranging from the 17-year-old techni-
cally adept student to the 60-year-old asset manager. In
contrast, the search for angel investors or venture capi-
talists is perceived as lengthy and troublesome. As one
CEO put it: “You can do fundraising with Sequoia or
with other incubators in five years or in three years. I do
it overnight. Let’s see who is faster.” In particular, the
time and costs required to raise traditional seed funding
were a major motivator to conduct an ICO as it provides
“a fast way of raising capital”. It must be recognized that
the ease of running a successful ICO has diminished
over time as the market has matured and regulators have
put pressure on startups to comply with local regula-
tions. However, the technical ease of issuing coins re-
mains unimpaired.
4.1.4 Hot market
With a volume of USD 31 billion, the ICO market
has created a gold rush opportunity for startups.
Attracted by the large sums raised by competing
startups, many saw the ICO hype as an opportunity
to exploit the prevailing market conditions. As one
CEO described: “We saw groups that didn’t have the
technology and knowledge that we have. Some of
them just had a white paper but they raised millions
and millions. We started to study if we can do the
same.” For blockchain startups, these were also per-
ceived as the “way [to] raise funds if you had a
crypto project”. This is especially true for startups
that raised money before the ICO hype started in
2017.
4.1.5 Lack of other funding options
Seed funding by BAs and VC was not available for
many blockchain startups due to several reasons. Ven-
ture capitalists were said to lack the understanding for
blockchain technology and respective solutions. As one
founder pointed out: “If we talked with anyone about
Bitcoin, we’d need to start with the very discussion
about why it is not a Ponzi-scheme, what Bitcoin is,
and what we call blockchain.” In other situations,
blockchain developers have been shut out as “there
was an immediate prejudice against crypto currencies
from all traditional financial institutions,” including
venture capitalists. Furthermore, interviewees perceived
their projects and startups as “not the rapid return on
investment type model that equity investors are looking
for.” The development of blockchain technology can
face longer time horizons than venture capitalists are
willing to take. These projects usually emphasize a
distributed and open source development of the tech-
nology, which constrains commercialization. Lastly,
many projects start with a white paper only, while ven-
ture capitalists usually require a working product and a
projected revenue stream, which are difficult to develop
without proper funding in the first place: “There was no
way we would have raised money with a VC to get us
operational.”
4.2 Community building
A strong community comes naturally with the develop-
ment of open source projects and has a long-standing
tradition in software development. This tradition is also
mirrored in the evolution of the blockchain ecosystem
and utilized by ICO-funded startups.
4.2.1 Validating the market
Startups use ICOs as a means for assessing the market
potential for their ideas and business models. By selling
tokens for a to-be-developed product or service to cus-
tomers, startups can test market demand and determine
future customers’ willingness to pay without a heavy
upfront investment in R&D. A CEO drew a comparison
to crowdfunding campaigns: “We were really just test-
ing the marketplace to see if there are future customers
that are willing to pay for a blockchain. We considered it
like a Kickstarter project, which tries to sell watches on
the market.” Due to the disruptive nature of blockchain
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technology, products and services face higher risk and
uncertainty compared to more traditional B2C products.
The token price acts as a mechanism for ascribing value
to the product or service and can help startups introduce
a technology while simultaneously reducing unknowns
in their go-to-market strategy.
4.2.2 Generating buzz
Startups leverage the ICO hype not only for funding
purposes but also to drive interest in their products and
services. An ICO is described as an “excellent way to
create that level of excitement” surrounding the launch
of a new project. By jumping on the ICO bandwagon,
startups can get the public’s attention efficiently without
excessive marketing expenditures. Additionally, the
ICO creates “a huge marketing group that will help
[…] launch the project.” This finding can also be related
to the hot market phenomenon previously described.
Investors, who wanted to profit from the gold rush,
worked as amplifiers for startups and became valuable
sources of testimonials and social media influencers for
not only a startup’s product but also its respective
funding campaign. In the search for a new ICO unicorn,
investors created artificial hype by spreading evalua-
tions, recommendations, and referrals across relevant
social media channels.
4.2.3 Kicking off network effect
As a distributed ledger, most blockchain applications
rely on a constant inflow and retention of participants
within the network. Network effects apply here; the
more users who participate in the network, the higher
the utility derived for each individual user. Kicking off
these network effects is generally a difficult undertaking
for platforms:
“There was the question of chicken-or-egg, which
is applicable to any marketplace application where
you need to bring supply and demand together. So
how do you do the magic circle with who comes
first? […] We wanted to create the network effect
we were looking for. It was part of the deal of
doing a new thing.”
Selling and distributing tokens via an ICO can thus
help engage users to participate within the network,
as token holders will see an appreciation in the value
of the token once the value of the network increases:
“The token is a way to incentivize the user.” Token
holders, thereby, have a natural incentive to invite
more users to the platform and enlarge the network,
hence driving the marginal value of the platform for
each user.
4.2.4 Creating a loyal customer base
Tokens can incentivize the user not only to participate
but also to be loyal to the underlying product or service.
As users have a long-term financial incentive to partic-
ipate, they will likely stick with the startup and generate
awareness through word-of-mouth among their peers.
Furthermore, token holders can expect to have access to
otherwise costly product benefits: “By holding tokens in
our services, you have advantageous access to services.
So, this is like your frequent flyer miles on an airline.”
These benefits can include price discounts and access
to further product or service features, as well as a voice
in the future direction of the startup’s product
development.
4.2.5 Wisdom of the crowd
Startups benefit from an ICO, as they create a large
community of innovators and lead users who often
share their knowledge, personal networks, and ex-
perience to guide the development of the project.
Community members serve as beta testers and pro-
vide early feedback on product features and weak-
nesses in the system. In this sense, the community is
perceived to be even more valuable than the funding
and creates additional resources and capabilities,
with users being directly involved and often having
full responsibility for certain remits. Comparing the
community to venture capitalists, many interviewees
claim that the community is equivalent if not supe-
rior to the operational value venture capitalists can
provide: “In a community-based model, it’s not just
one VC that looks over your shoulders, but you have
400 to 500 people doing the same.” Conversely, the
community expects to be informed and updated
about major developments within the startup or net-
work, often compelling startups to employ dedicated
personnel to engage with the community. Managing
this relationship can be “worse than having a boss.”
Why do startups pursue initial coin offerings (ICOs)? The role of economic drivers and social identity on...
4.3 Tokenomics
We define tokenomics as the decisions concerning the
design of the token, the underlying blockchain, and the
governing entity. Blockchain technology creates oppor-
tunities for designing organizations and businessmodels
that are valued by founders and startups. In this sense,
tokens are multi-purpose instruments that can entail a
governing function within an organization. The distri-
bution of this token is accordingly a crucial decision in
any ICO.
4.3.1 Decentralizing organization
The blockchain creates a transparent ownership struc-
ture, which startups leverage to decentralize decision
making. Inspired by “The DAO”—(decentralized au-
tonomous organization) one of the earliest attempts for
a decentralized autonomous organization—startups use
an ICO to distribute voting rights within the network.
Under certain protocols, this distribution is necessary to
run the network as it ensures that all nodes have a proper
incentive to confirm only valid new transactions to the
public ledger. However, it is also used as a voting
mechanism for decision making within organizations:
“We have a distributed autonomous organization. We
have a governance document that dictates how you
make decisions in our system.” This implies that orga-
nizations do not hold sole decision making authority
other than the collective vote. As a result, token
holders can vote to prioritize the development of
new product features, advance the business strategy,
or make crucial decisions about the organizational
structure and personnel.
4.3.2 Inherent blockchain characteristics
Startups value inherent blockchain characteristics such
as transparency, immutability, openness, and trust. In
line with the decentralization of a startup’s organization-
al structure, the blockchain and its underlying token
create transparency beyond the voting process: “One
of our core values is transparency and honesty. […]
Not only are we telling you that we are honest, but here
is the book [referring to the blockchain], it is open, and
it’s a technology-based thing.”
The technology enables startups to be “transparent in
how to create value,” as all transactions, votes, and
contracts are written in the immutable blockchain. Si-
multaneously, every stakeholder can examine these
transactions without further ado and can thereby control
or evaluate actions by the startup and community. Fraud
or unethical behavior by the fiducially acting startup,
which would presumably lead to a withdrawal of inves-
tors’ money and the subsequent decline of the network,
can be identified promptly. As many startups envision
creating a global technological standard in their respec-
tive field, trust becomes a necessary and important
condition, which can be fostered through the distribu-
tion of tokens and inherent implications.
4.3.3 Business model requirements
Business models can be designed to rely on the
blockchain and a distributed token to operate. In these
settings, the blockchain not only serves as a technolog-
ical component of the business model but also incorpo-
rates elements that are vital to the business models’
value proposition (e.g., for businessmodels that promise
to be decentralized). The business model can also be
built around the blockchain and the underlying token.
This is especially true for decentralized network econo-
mies that attempt to replace multi-sided platforms con-
trolled by a single player. In these settings, the platform
intermediary is substituted by a self-governing
blockchain protocol. The necessity for certain business
models was highlighted by one interviewee, who ar-
gued: “For some kinds of networks you really need that
coin. There is no other option. How will you start your
business without the ICO?” This can relate to several
features of the business model, such as the token being
tied to product usage, executing smart contracts required
for the business model, user contributions to a value-
adding action for the network, monetary incentives for
users, or the token simply being used as a means of
payment. Often, startups design the business model,
token, and blockchain characteristics and the underlying
governing entity in conjunction with each other, where
issuing a token becomes a fundamental aspect of
starting the project: “You have to have to make sure that
you have some sort of usage for the token.” These
projects are often also open source, and their business
models are purely built to financially sustain the main-
tenance and development of the system.
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4.4 Personal and ideological drivers
While funding, community building, and tokenomics
refer to advantages and drivers mostly on the organiza-
tional level, interviewees also expressed personal and
behavioral drivers that motivated them individually to
conduct an ICO irrespective of perceived organizational
advantages. These drivers can—to a large extent—be
labeled as ideologically motivated and resulting from a
dissatisfaction with the societal and monetary system.
4.4.1 Control preferences
In contrast to equity financing, founders do not need to
give up equity to raise funds for ICOs. Although finan-
cial incentives play a role, our interviewees preferred the
ICO as a mode of financing to keep control rights,
especially in light of venture capitalists, who “bleed
[the startup] dry” and “dictate terms.” Interviewees
showed resentment towards traditional financial
investors—often due to previous experiences with
startups.
“Once you’re in bed with VCs then your hands are
tied a lot in terms of executive decisions. When
things are going well they’re good, but when
things aren’t going so well then you have some-
body over your shoulder and that may not be that
great for the entrepreneurs.”
These resentments can also be linked to the open source
and long-term character of blockchain startups men-
tioned previously, which are generally not well received
by venture capitalists. Further, incorporating the com-
munity in the governance of a project becomes difficult
once a VC investor holds an equity stake in the startup.
Interests of the community and venture capitalists can
diverge considerably.
4.4.2 Experimentation
Interviewees also expressed their personal interest in the
technology and general curiosity as a motive to conduct
an ICO. As the total number of ICOs is still comparably
low, interviewees showed an affinity towards counting
themselves among the first to conduct an ICO. Learning
and becoming familiar with the technology was another
motive mentioned.
4.4.3 Grassroots decision making
As previously discussed, the desire to shift authority to
the lowest level of the organization is linked to the
tendency to use an ICO as a way of decentralizing an
organization. The “spirit of the [blockchain] platform” is
to distribute authority. Interviewees demonstrated an
innate commitment to mirror the distributed element of
the blockchain in a democratic decision making model
“where people can participate” and “make decisions
together in a crowd”. As one interviewee stated: “One
of my real motivations and passions really was an alter-
native economic system, a more holistic grassroots,
decentralized approach.” Interviewees saw themselves
as “outliers” in an economic system that is controlled by
the few for the many. They regarded blockchain tech-
nology as a way of changing the prevailing hegemony
of institutions and to create “disruptive innovation” in a
collective way.
4.4.4 Democratization of wealth
The grassroots approach also translates to the participa-
tion in a financial system that is traditionally reserved
for institutional investors and high-net-worth individ-
uals only, while being closed to the public:
“Eventually, the wealth of the digital industry can
be distributed more democratically. […] The
wealth that is generated would not only end up
in the pockets of founders and VCs, but suddenly
also in the pockets of all other people who find it
interesting.”
Resentment towards venture capitalists is also shown in
this respect. Interviewees wanted people to have access
to a greater quantity and quality of investment opportu-
nities and sought to provide financial freedom with their
ICOs.
4.4.5 Philanthropy
The blockchain technology is often linked to the em-
powerment of people and societal progress, as it stands
“for freedom of speech, privacy, [and] human rights.”
“Doing something that was right” and working on
something that has “some form of conscious element
to it” drives founders to explore opportunities in the
blockchain ecosystem. As previously mentioned, many
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projects do not follow a profit motive but instead are
interested in “changing the world” and “the progress of
humanity” by providing general technological infra-
structure to society.
5 Discussion
Our evidence shows that entrepreneurs’ rationales for
pursuing an ICO cover a multifaceted spectrum, which
diverges from the single purpose of funding the startup.
By not fitting the traditional characteristics and perfor-
mance criteria of venture capitalists, the blockchain
ecosystem—enabled by the sheer opportunities of the
underlying technology—simply created its own form of
financing. This constitutes a unique phenomenon in
entrepreneurial finance. Our findings can be related to
several streams of the academic literature.
5.1 Entrepreneurial finance
Regarding the literature on entrepreneurial finance, we
demonstrate that ICO-funded startups and entrepreneurs
show strong resentment towards traditional financing
vehicles such as VC. The literature regards VC funding
as a desirable goal, with performance-enhancing effects
due to value-added services by VCs such as coaching
and mentoring (Davila et al. 2003; Sørensen 2007;
Croce et al. 2013; Gutmann et al. 2019), benefits from
the networks of well-connected VCs, for example to
strategic partners (Lindsey 2008), as well as certification
(Hsu 2004). These effects increase the likelihood that
entrepreneurs will sell equity stakes to reputable inves-
tors even at a discount. For ICO-funded firms, entrepre-
neurs seem to neglect these effects, relating to an overly
narrow focus of VCs in their investment choices, the
crowd as a substitute for value-added services, the in-
creased time and resources requirements associated with
finding VC funding, and divergent objectives in venture
development between VCs and founders. While making
a distinction fromVC funding, we expected to find links
to the nascent research on crowdfunding, which shows
similar patterns and characteristics to ICOs. To date,
however, the peer-reviewed literature on crowdfunding
has barely investigated the different motives and ratio-
nales for funding through crowdfunding campaigns.
Related to capital structure theory, Walthoff-Borm
et al. (2018) found that firms opt for equity
crowdfunding when internal funds and debt capacity
are exhausted and regard equity crowdfunding as last
resort for struggling firms.
For respective founders, an ICO seems to be the path
of least resistance in financing their startups. As many
ICO-funded startups attach use rights to their issued
tokens, these become vouchers for a future service or
product. In this sense, the ICO is similar to a product
pre-sale which can be associated with financial
bootstrapping (Winborg and Landström 2001; Ebben
and Johnson 2006). This form of financing is synony-
mous with internal funds, which are commonly identi-
fied as the preferred choice of venture financing, as they
have the lowest cost of capital and founders maintain
their control rights (Alvarez and Parker 2009). It is
however questionable whether this financing truly rep-
resents internal funds, as research shows that ICO in-
vestors expect a financial return on their investments,
which is uncommon for product pre-sales (Fisch et al.
2019). In addition, the SEC strictly classifies tokens as
securities if they show specific characteristics irrespec-
tive of being assigned use rights.
5.2 Entrepreneurial decision making and social identity
We further relate our findings to the literature on entre-
preneurial decision making, which has focused only to a
limited extent on funding choices. The decision to opt
for ICO funding is largely driven by factors that are not
considered by academic research. Prior research has
rather been concerned with the entrepreneur’s percep-
tion of the startup, the market, and associated risk
(Schwienbacher 2007; Winton and Yerramilli 2008;
Alvarez and Parker 2009) or personal traits such as
experience, networks, and prior education (Seghers
et al. 2012). Instead, our respondents were attracted by
the new opportunities and perceived advantages an ICO
offers. Economically, financing with an ICO is regarded
as an easy vehicle that does not require a heavy resource
input but delivers considerable funding outcomes in a
hot cryptocurrency market, while also providing value-
added services through the crowd. More importantly,
however, the behavioral drivers are new to this stream of
literature. Although research on entrepreneurship has
shown that entrepreneurs rely on a different set of
decision making principles that incorporate their prior
experience and education as well as their tastes, prefer-
ences, and perceived identity (Sarasvathy 2001;
Fauchart and Gruber 2011), ideological drivers have
not been incorporated previously. We demonstrate that
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these play a distinct role, as many respondents perceive
themselves as “outliers” who do not see themselves
represented in the prevailing economic and societal
system. Liberal and progressive thinking characterize
these individual entrepreneurs who are, in part, guided
by the cult surrounding Satoshi Nakamoto, as one co-
founder stated: “Always ask yourself: ‘what would
Satoshi do?” Although many entrepreneurs regard
themselves as agents for change (Fauchart and Gruber
2011), our respondents often tried to differentiate them-
selves from the shiny and glorified Silicon Valley entre-
preneurs. They regarded the technology as a way to
overturn the prevailing economic system, which they
perceived as unfair and skewed to the rich. Especially in
the context of entrepreneurial finance, many saw the VC
industry as the only winner in innovation and entrepre-
neurship, which drove them towards ICO funding.
Based on these findings, links can be drawn to
relevant theories that may explain some of our
findings, in particular social identity theory (Tajfel
and Turner 1979; Ashforth and Mael 1989), which
has lately received attention in entrepreneurship
research (Fauchart and Gruber 2011; Gruber and
MacMillan 2017). As individuals self-categorize
into different social groups and thereby create
distinct social identities that serve as schemes of
social orientation, we can interpret their decisions
based on the cognitive frames and norms used
within these contexts. Fauchart and Gruber (2011)
propose three types of founder identities, which
help scholars in understanding entrepreneurial be-
havior: Darwinian (focused on financial success),
communitarian (focused on contributing to commu-
nities), and missionary (focused on societal
change). Prior research has linked entrepreneur’s
identities, among other factors, to internationaliza-
tion decisions (Bolzani and Der Foo 2018), re-
sponses to adversity (Powell and Baker 2014), or-
ganizational inertia and flexibility (Zuzul and
Tripsas 2019), and engagement in environmental
entrepreneurship (York et al. 2016). We can extend
these findings and show that the funding decision
for ICO-funded startups is largely driven by strong
missionary identities of entrepreneurs merged with
a focus on community engagement. We contem-
plate that this drive is historically rooted in the
blockchain community, which came into existence
in 2009 after the financial crisis and promised a
new economic and financial system based on
blockchain technology, which, by itself, can be
seen as an ideological movement. Further,
cryptocurrencies have often been linked to money
laundering, drug trafficking, and illegal activities in
general. This created a distinct separation between
the blockchain ecosystem and the mainstream en-
trepreneurship as well as capital markets. Respon-
dents saw themselves as being excluded from this
system either through geographic separation, lack
of commercialization possibilities, or lack of per-
sonal merit (Cosh et al. 2009). This “Us vs. Them”
sentiment leads to startups in the blockchain eco-
system showing a strong attachment to their mis-
sion and underlying values, which are also embod-
ied by the technology itself and eventually in the
funding choice.
It is crucial to understand that these ideological
drivers are shared by the entrepreneur’s relevant
social world, which provides considerable resources
and capabilit ies to the startup (Gruber and
MacMillan 2017). Entrepreneurs in the blockchain
ecosystem see different non-traditional pathways to
value creation, which are embedded in the ecosys-
tem and show signs of institutionalization, as one
respondent said: “It was the thing to do at the time.”
The ICO can be regarded as a legitimacy threshold
in the development of a blockchain-based startup.
Especially young ventures, who depend on external
funding, need to be perceived as legitimate by in-
vestors and therefore adopt category-specific pro-
cesses and structures. Considering that the audience
in crowd-funded projects, such as ICOs, has differ-
ent beliefs, norms, and rules for assessing a venture
compared to traditional funding sources (Fisch et al.
2019), the entrepreneur’s identity is oftentimes a
reflection of underlying routines and values and is
imprinted in entrepreneurial behavior (Navis and
Glynn 2011; Fisher et al. 2016).
5.3 Digital entrepreneurship
Related to the nascent stream of digital entrepreneurship
(Nambisan 2017), we find evidence that the technology
enables startups to create new organizational forms and
business models governed by the underlying token.
These forms and models are distinct from traditional
governance and incentive mechanisms, reflecting not
only a communitarian identity but also the nature as
open source projects (von Krogh and von Hippel
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2006; O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007), which has been
linked to entrepreneurial identity and motivation (Greul
et al. 2018). The blockchain technology enables new
venture creation and thereby constitutes a substitute for
traditional funding alternatives in terms of funding, but
also in terms of feedback through a community-based
approach (Ahlstrom et al. 2018). We can relate these
findings to von Briel et al. (2018) and confirm that
digital technologies can provide a substitutive mecha-
nism to startups by replacing traditional resources or
resource dependencies in traditional pathways to entre-
preneurship. Relating to Nambisan et al. (2019) the
blockchain technology shows the potential to transform
the degree of openness in entrepreneurship by increas-
ing the variance in participants and outcomes.
In this regard, the blockchain technology further
redefines the boundaries of agency as it can incor-
porate a diverse range of stakeholders, incentivize
them and democratize decision making in a startup,
therefore leading to community building and a more
collective way of engaging in entrepreneurship.
ICO-funded startups perceive the community and
crowd as a relevant factor in pursuing an ICO.
Incentivized by the organizational structure and a
potential appreciation of the underlying token, in-
vestors feel more committed to participating in the
development of the startup and are likely to serve as
advisors and beta testers. Startups thereby have a
unique tool to incentivize the development of
multi-sided platforms and kick off network effects
without spending on promotion. This is also in line
with our argument for tokenomics, which suggests
that technological characteristics of the blockchain
and the underlying design of the technology and
token drive the choice of an ICO. Being governed
by the blockchain and the underlying token, entre-
preneurs can relax control and draw on the
blockchain’s capacity to foster exchange and value
creation (Nambisan et al. 2018; von Briel et al.
2018). These technological shifts go hand in hand
with the abovementioned social identity of the foun-
ders and entrepreneurs: community building, shared
value creation and a joint mission and belief system
shape the economic and sociotechnical interactions
between founders, community, and technology. The
ICO becomes a manifestation of the underlying
technology, but also of the social ecosystem. Entre-
preneurs are able to draw on the reputation of the
blockchain and incorporate inherent characteristics
such as trust, openness and immutability in their self
and their startup (Nambisan et al. 2018).
Further, elements of a distributed autonomous orga-
nization can frequently be found among motives of
entrepreneurs to conduct an ICO. This poses not only
new challenges but also opportunities to corporate gov-
ernance and organizational theory (Wareham et al. 2014;
Cumming et al. 2019). By issuing tokens and
decentralizing their organizations, startups can create
unique structures that are self-governed and self-
regulated through the economic incentive generated by
the underlying token.
5.4 Limitations and avenues for future research
We employed a qualitative and inductive research
approach that mainly relied on semi-structured inter-
views. This approach brings with it issues of external
validity and reliability. Although we took measures
to reduce interview bias, such as conducting pilot
interviews, avoiding leading questions, and giving
interviewees the chance to sum up their arguments,
we cannot undoubtedly guarantee that our data col-
lection process is reliable. Regarding our approach to
data analysis, we have strong confidence that the
rigorous and disciplined process yielded credible in-
terpretations of the data. Furthermore, we are confi-
dent that we reached a considerable degree of data
saturation. However, as some scholars (e.g., Blaseg
2018) have identified more than 1000 ICOs in their
samples, our sample size shrinks to a mere 3% of the
whole population. In this regard, larger samples and
surveys should validate our findings.
As ICOs constitute an as of yet unexplored and
nascent field of inquiry, our findings need to be
complemented by future research in this area to provide
a broader context and shape our understanding of ICOs.
First, our study demonstrates that funding is considered
a primary motive to conduct an ICO. A better under-
standing of the factors that determine the amount of
funding is needed, and attention should be devoted to
moral hazard issues once startups raise more funds than
needed. In this context, future research could also ex-
plore what control mechanisms for investors can be
established and how ICOs can be regulated. Moreover,
during our interviews, we debated whether ICOs were
complementary to or a substitute for venture capital.
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Future studies should attempt to answer this question
and dive into the effect that ICOs have on the VC
industry. Particularly interesting is the value-added as-
pect in this context. As VCs add value to their portfolio
companies by providing smart capital and thus non-
financial benefits to help their portfolio companies cre-
ate and capture value (Sørensen 2007; Croce et al. 2013;
Gutmann 2019), future research could investigate
whether value-added services are truly provided by the
ICO community. Future longitudinal studies could ex-
plore the long-term success of ICO-funded companies
compared to VC-funded startups and investigate at
which stage of the startup are ICOs best employed.
Second, the community building aspect emerged
as an impetus to conduct an ICO. More research is
needed to understand how startups engage with their
communities, which engagement model is the most
effective, and especially how this engagement af-
fects ICO performance. Furthermore, some ICOs
were used to sell and distribute tokens with the
aim of sparking network effects. More research on
this topic should be undertaken before the associa-
tion of token sales and distribution with network
effects can be better understood.
Third, as tokenomics—the decisions concerning
the design of the token, the underlying blockchain,
and the governing entity—emerged as a main reason
to conduct an ICO, further research should be under-
taken to investigate this dimension. Several questions
remain unanswered in terms of the different token
designs used in ICOs. Moreover, the emergence of
new organizational forms such as the DAO calls for
future elaboration, for instance, how does the DAO
affect our understanding of what constitutes an orga-
nization and how we think about governance in both
a for-profit and a non-profit context (Wareham et al.
2014; Nambisan et al. 2018). We further establish an
interplay between a startup’s funding choice and its
business model. As many blockchain startups’ busi-
ness models rely on an underlying token to operate,
issuing the respective token is indispensable. This
ties the funding choice to the business model.
Though scholars have established a link between
corporate strategy and capital structure (Barton and
Gordon 1988; Kochhar and Hitt 1998), a relationship
between business model and financing is something
not yet recognized in the academic literature. There is
a need to investigate whether this interplay can be
extended beyond solely blockchain applications as
the ICO space matures.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigated the different economic and behav-
ioral factors that motivate entrepreneurs to fund their
startup operations with ICOs. ICOs have become a main-
stream source of capital, especially for blockchain startups,
and have driven billions of dollars into the blockchain
ecosystem while challenging traditional funding vehicles
such as BA or VC investments. By conducting in-depth
interviews with C-level managers or founders of ICO-
funded startups, our rigorous analysis revealed four dimen-
sions that have an impact on the decision to undertake an
ICO: funding, community building, tokenomics, and per-
sonal and ideological drivers. We contribute to the litera-
ture on entrepreneurial finance by furthering the under-
standing of this new source of finance and to the literature
on entrepreneurial decision making by providing qualita-
tive insights into the funding choice of entrepreneurs. We
show that entrepreneurs’ identity, manifested in behavioral
and ideological drivers, is a distinct driver in opting for an
ICO. Our contribution is relevant for both practitioners in
the financial industry aswell as for regulators attempting to
discern the nascent funding vehicle that an ICO represents.
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Dimension Themes Representative quotes
Funding Unlocking capital of individual
investors globally
“I think the biggest advantage is tapping a completely new set of investors that do not have the
agenda, that traditional investors have.”
“The best thing is that it is open for every investor to invest in because we know that many
projects are closed to investors.”
“Before, nobody gave a shit about startups in a small country.
But now Americans and all the big countries are calling us to help them.”
“It really comes down to this new way to fund or finance companies. It unlocks capital.”
“It’s like regular crowdfunding, with token sales, you remove the need for paying their fees.
So there are platforms taking a piece of the raise that you do.
And ICOs are a version of that, but on steroids.”
Creating liquidity “So everything can become tradable if you tokenize it.”
“The whole difference that will change this industry forever is that your investment can be
traded right away. Before, when you invested in a startup, the exit was in five years,
and today it’s in one week. It’s steroids for the whole industry.”
“If I create a token for the fund, then it is tradable and suddenly it creates an innovation in an
asset class which used to be totally static.”
“We value the token because of the utility function that it provides. It does provide a
straightforward way for a private organization to being shareholders or stakeholders
- to enter and to exit.”
Ease of funding “You can do fundraising with Sequoia or with the incubators in five years, in three years.
I do it overnight. So let us see who is faster.”
“I mean, it’s definitely easy money. You do not have to do as much as you would have to do
with, like, if you are looking for seed investors. The problem is a lot of the projects that are
ICOing have recognized that and are just flimsy bullshit that would never get funded
anyways. But in the ICO space they can get a shit ton of money.”
“You could actually launch an ICO very easily with like minimal efforts and resources.”
“That is akin to web shops. And basically starting an ICO is much like starting a web shop,
anybody can do that.”
“Another big advantage is that most ways of raising money today outside of ICOs have large
barriers to entry. Finding an angel investor is very hard, but about anyone can go through
the steps and issue an ICO.”
“I think the really exciting thing for me that it was accessible to anybody.
Anybody with an idea who can put together a sales pitch can run an ICO.”
Hot market “And then I said, well, ‘Here comes the ICO boom. Let us do an ICO.’”
“It was like a big hot thing. It was the thing to do at the time, right?”
“We saw groups that did not have the technology and knowledge that we have. Some of them
just had a white paper but they raised millions and millions. We started to study if we can
do the same.”
“So as crypto hobbyists, my co-founder and I have been seeing the ICO market blowing up.
The straw that really made it: We have been thinking about an ICO, we have sketched it out
internally, we thought about it, and then when we saw […] the bad token, sell 30 million
dollars in 30 seconds, or whatever that was. We thought: ‘Yes, we are going to do this!’”
“But that was the way you’d raise funds if you had a crypto project. That’s how you would do
that.”
Lack of other funding options “If you want to develop your project for three to four years, even five years before you have
your breakthrough, most VCs cannot hang on that long.”
“There was no way we would have raised money with a VC’s to get us operational.”
“Venture Capitalist were not actually looking into crypto. I’m talking about 2014.
No one knew what crypto is, if we talked with anyone about Bitcoin, we’d need to start
with the very discussion about why it is not a Ponzi-scheme, what Bitcoin is,
what we call blockchain.”
“Most open source projects are just kind of a labour of love by somebody who does them and
does not get paid and it’s numb. But we have open source projects now that never would
happen without funding.”
“We asked around some VC’s firms, plenty of times, but they would not do a deal with us.”
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“Simply because they [VC’s] lack the understanding of how blockchain technology works.
Even today, still, they do not understand it.”
“We had been talking to VCs. Their major interest is seeing a working product before they
invest. And that has been the case all along
“It’s not the rapid return on investment type model that equity investors are looking for
because this is the kind of things they look at it and say ‘too much risk, too much unknown,
toomuch uncertainty, and too long before we can even think about getting ourmoney back.
It does not make sense for us to invest in something like that.’”
“I think the ICO space not only emerged but got as big as it did as fast as it did because crypto
developers could not access traditional venture capital. They were shut out.
There was an immediate prejudice against crypto currencies from all traditional financial
institutions.”
“I think what’s happening now is a very good idea, which very early stage themes can use as a
mechanism to get a reasonable amount of funds to get the project flow.
It works really well.”
“Making it easier for people to get funds to build their ideas rather then traditional funding
routes where you have to know a lot.”




Validating the market “Because, well, mostly because we were not sure how this will go.
So, you are basically testing the market by doing that.”
“You get to see how interested the market is. So it is a little bit of a market assessment.
Checking out the demand.”
“What we had to do, we literally had to create a market price for the product.
So there had to be a sale and there had to be an exchange for it to be useable,
because we needed a monetary basis for the branded tokens that we made.
So that sort of helped do that.”
“When we produce a product, they operate as beta testers.”
Wewere really just testing the marketplace to see if there are future customers that are willing
to pay for a blockchain. We considered it like a Kickstarter project, which tries to sell
watches on the market.”
Generating buzz “You create a huge marketing group that will help you launch the project.”
“It has very little to do with blockchain innovation and a whole lot to do with getting the
public’s attention very efficiently, cost efficiently.”
“So the ICO is an excellent way to create that level of excitement and invention.”
“The advantage of the token sale was to drive interest in [our product], to gain investors and to
build the ecosystem which requires a distribution of the tokens to the public.”
Kicking off network effect “Wewanted to create the network effect we were looking for. It was part of the deal of doing a
new thing.”
“It’s also a way to jumpstart the internal mechanism of the product right off the bat.”
“The token is a way to incentivize the user.”
“The value of the cryptocurrency is tied to the network effects and you only get a network
effect if lots of people are holding the cryptocurrency.”
“In our understanding, the token sale brings a lot of people on the platform.”
“There was the question of chicken-or-egg, which is applicable to any marketplace
application where you need to bring supply and demand together. So how do you do the
magic circle with who comes first? And how do you create this network? […] We wanted
to create the network effect we were looking for. It was part of the deal of doing a new
thing.”
Creating a loyal customer basis “By holding tokens in our services, you have advantageous access to services.
So this is like your frequent flyer miles on an airline.”
“If it’s a B2C product, you can bind end customers differently. The customer has a feeling for
the product. The customer loyalty is so strong, that they are even willing to pay for their
loyalty.”
“Today that is what you are looking for: people who are totally engaged to your vision,
who love your products, or love that what the team is capable of doing.”
Wisdom of the crowd “We benefit from the fact that a lot of these people are highly educated, technically adept,
clued in the news, and they bring all that intelligence into the selection process.”
“For us, it was more about generating the community and really testing the hypothesis of the
wisdom of the crowd.”
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“It has been really helpful to have a community. Having this regular feedback has been really
helpful for guidance in developing our product and our strategy.”
“I think the community aspect is more valuable then the funding.”
“The new crypto investors are similar to VCs. They are new kinds of investors, who also have
a network and can support us. I think it’s equivalent to a VC’s.”
“In a community-based model, it’s not just one VC’s that looks over your shoulders,
but you have 400 to 500 people doing the same.”
“However, when you have a community of a couple of thousand people asking you everyday
things, it’s a big push. It’s worse then having a boss. I’m not kidding.”
Tokenomics Decentralizing organization “It was one of the earliest DAOs – a decentralized autonomous organization.
We had a unique protocol for decision making within the community and basically the
legal entity was just the execution arm for the community.”
“So, in a nutshell: If you have tokens, you can be part of the ecosystem for blockchain
governance.”
“Our intention is to exit and have it fully decentralized within three or four years.”
“Constructing an ecosystem that will run on its own in the distributed autonomous fashion
requires a token, because the protocol has to be able to pay people to run it.”
“And so we, we are a distributed autonomous protocol. And thus we have a distributed
autonomous organization. We have a governance document that dictates how you make
decisions in our system.”




“It’s not so much decentralization, which is talked a lot about. It’s more about transparency,
building a reputation on transparencies. This is actually where the main value is coming
from.”
“One of our core values is transparency and honesty. […] Not only are we telling you that we
are honest, but here is the book [referring to the blockchain], it is open, and it’s a
technology-based thing”
“That vote is recorded on the blockchain, so it is absolutely immutable and it is absolutely
transparent. Anybody who can read a blockchain explorer can see the results of that vote,
so it makes it very, very attractive to people whomight not trust a more conventional voting
mechanism..”
Business model requirements “You have to have to make sure that you have some sort of usage for the token.
Especially for the company that is not a traditional crypto company, you have to see
whether or not it is worth the hassle.”
“If you want to substitute a platform economy with a network economy, and really set-up a
decentralized network economy for certain industries then I believe in the power of an
ICO.”
“In blockchain based solutions and open standards in which tokens really make sense, an ICO
also makes sense.”
“You need this token in order for the blockchain to operate.”
“Yes, for some kinds of networks you really need that coin. There is no other option.




Control preferences “So the biggest advantage is that you are not giving away equity from a financial perspective.
You’re not giving away control rights. You collect money without giving away
something.”
“Once you are in bed with VC's then your hands are tied a lot in terms of executive decisions
and when things are going well it’s good, but when things aren’t going so well then you
have somebody over your shoulder and that may not be that great for the entrepreneurs.”
“I own the company and I do not have to answer to anyone at this point.”
“I do not like giving away equity. Especially not to some VC's.”
“Because of the previous company that our founder had, he knew the VC’s bleeds you dry,
right? They dictate terms. Very rarely the founder’s incentives and VC’s incentives align.”
“We did not really like the idea of having one, either one person or a few people,
coming with money that would then dictate how the business was going to go.”
Experiment “Why we did the ICO? Because we were curious.”
“I thought it’d be a really neat experiment.”
“It’s an experiment. We wanted to get familiar with the technology. See if can we do it.”
“So we do the ICO, because we basically wanted to test the waters.”
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